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from the Editor 
Greetings from Southwest Asia' Your editor was mobilized for the 
duration, and is writing to you from the Military History Group at the 
Coalition Forces Land Component Commander's headquarters in 
Kuwait [ represent the Marine Corps' Historical Division. Together 
with my Army colleagues, we are working to capture the history of this 
campaign before the electrons evanesce, and human memories fade. 
Though this is hardly a gilrden spot, it has been a fascinating experience, 
especially for an historian. 
Before I left home, I put this issue together out of four articles, and 
Tina Offerjost, our typesetter, put them into an attractive format-and 
sent me the proofs as attachments to e-mails.This is the first time that 
we have done business this way-and it works! 
The first of the four articles is by David Snead, who has written about 
a neglected piece of military real estate, the Russell Islands in the South 
Pacific. They are located north of Guadalcanal, and were important for 
the Marine Corps when it needed a training base and an expeditionary 
arrfield. The author teUs 11S that the airiield was more of a success than 
the training base, and he describes the misery that the Marines who 
landed there had to endme. . 
Robert Bush has 'i.,vritten an article about the colonial regin1es in 
Louisiana. The article contains a [at of data about the administration of 
the territory, something that is not standard fare for us, but it provides the 
context for interesting data about the forts that the Europeans built 
before France sold Louisiana to the United States in 1803. He makes it 
clear that the colonial administrators were very concerned about their 
personal prerogatives and authorities. As [ read the article, I wondered 
if there "vas something about the overseas experience that caused 
expatriates to focus on such things. 
Then, when I read Clark Burkett's analysis of a duel in Mississippi in 
1810, I wondered if expatriates and frontiersmen had something in 
common-an obsession v"lith honor. His article grew out of an article 
about fort Washington, MiSSiSSippi, that we published in an earlier 
issue of JAMP. Perhaps, if you're isolated at a faraway post, affairs of 
honor take on exaggerated importance. On the other hand, I suppose it 
would be possible to argue that perhaps they had something to do with 
being an officer and a gentleman in that era. 
The last article in the issue is bv Mike Brodhead. His article about a 
fight between General Crook and~ a group of Indians after the Civil War 
provides interesting insights into a little-known clash and a piece of 
terrain known as the "Indian Gibraltar." Jt is also a good biographical 
essay on one aspect of Crook's life. 
Finally, our book review editor, Harold Raugh, once again has put 
together a first-rate selection of book revic\vs, along with a note on a 
university press, that of New Mexico, that witl be of interest to many of 
our readers. 
Nick Reynolds, Editor 
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1943 was a pivotal year in World War II as the tide of the war 
unquestionably turned in favor of the Allies. In late January and early 
February the Battles of Stalingrad and Cuadalcanal drew to a close. 
In Mav combined American and British forces pushed the Axis 
powers out of North Africa. 1Nhile the war was far hom over, 
optimism prevailed in the Allied camps as the Axis forces in Europe 
and the Pacific went on the defensive. It was in this transition period 
that the Russell Islands, a small archipelago in the Solomon Islands, 
rose from obscurity to play an important role in the Allies' ultimate 
victorv in the South Pacific and the historv of the 1st Marine f):vision. 
As °the Battle of Guadalcanal wound to'its end in late January 1943, 
Admiral Chester Nimitz, the commander-in-chief of the U.s. ~Pacific 
Fleet, gave his approval for Operation Cleanslate, the seizure and 
transformation of the Russell Islands into a forward operating base.' 
Nimitz and Admiral William F. Halsev, the commander of the South 
Pacific Area and South Pacific Force, s~aw the capture of these islands 
as the first step in the conquest of the central and northern Solomon 
Islands. Ultimately, success in the Solomons would provide one 
element in the isolation of the Japanese stronghold at Rabaul on New 
Britain.' Although Allied control of the Russells was nol essential to 
achieving success in the Solomons, the islands proved very valuable 
as an air base, staging area, and training center. 
The Russells are located in the Solomon Islands less than rift v miles 
northwest of Guadalcanal and approximately 120 miles southe,'sl of 
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the New Georgia Islands. Stretching ten miles north to south and 
twentv miles east to west, the Russells consist of over fifty small 
islands centered around the two largest: Banika and Pavuvu. The 
former is roughly eight by two miles, and the latter is eight by seven 
miles.' Approximately 350 natives lived on the islands prior to the 
war and helped cultivate coconut plantations owned by Lever 
Brothers.' Outside of these few inhabitants and select others, no one 
knew or cared much about these islands before the war. 
This perception of the Russells changed after the Battle of 
Guadalcanal and with the American plans to isolate Rabaul. Broadly 
defined, the isolation of Rabaul called for forces under the command 
of Generar Douglas MacArthur to seize parts of New Guinea and 
New Britain and Admiral Halsey to capture strategic bases in the 
Solomons. The next major target in the Solomons after the capture of 
Guadalcanal was New Georgia, located roughly 170 miles further 
north. It is because of that distance and the Russells' advantageous 
position that they became significant. If the United States forces 
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by-passed the Russells, they iaced the potential danger Hut the 
Japanese would occupy the islands and pose a threat to Glladaicanal 
and American operations to the north." I'urthermore, once In U.S. 
possession, the Russells offered potential airfields, PT boat bases, and 
staging areas for future operations.;' The airfields became particularly 
jn1portant. "For Allied operations V\'orked in such a "''lay,'' Air force 
historian Kramer Rohfleisch argues, "that each iresh base became a 
successive cancer in the structure of enemv's defense lines, sending 
out its tentacles and relentlessly destroy,ng the equipment and 
personnel opposing it.'" 
The Japanese never occupied the Russell Islands in any force." 
They mainly used them in the last week of January and early 
Febmary as a staging area for their withdrawal from Cuadakana1." 
The best estimate of Japanese troop strength in the islands in early 
February is 400, although this number could have temporarily 
fluctuated to 5,000 as forces withdrew from C;uadalcanal.'" The last 
Japanese troops \vithdrew from the Russells 50rnetime between 
Februarv 7 and 10." Reconnaissance of the islands in the ten davs 
proceed'ing Cleanslate by Australian coastwatchers Jnd a team 'of 
U.s. Armv, 1v1arinc, and Navy officers and .:\ie''''' Zealand Army 
officers found some hastilv abandoned equipment but no Japanese 
troopS.l1 Despite the repO'rts of the Japanese withdrawal. i\.c1miral 
Halsey decided to carry out the operation as planned on Febwilrv Zl 
since he feared that the Japanese might suddenly decide to reinforce 
the islands, and he sa"v the operation as a practice run for "=utllrt' 
island-to-island movements in the Solomons.' 
t-,.1ost of the invasion force for the opera.tion assembled in Nc\v 
Caledonia before being transported to Guadalcanal." The Japanese 
did detect the convoy transporting most of the troops to Guadalcmal 
and launched one air attack on February 17. While the attack failed 
to produce any damagc f jt did make (] vivid impression on most ot the 
soldiers and sailors on board the ships since it was the first tin1€ m.any 
of them had faced enemy fire. An officer from the 118th Engineer 
Combat Battalion claimed, "Anyone of the men can relale the 
excitement, thrills, and experiences of the first attack.'" Captain John 
Doll, the commanding officer of the 43rd Cavalry Reconnaiss;mce 
Troop, was even more graphic. '"Then all hell hroke loose," he 
reportcd f /I as every gun in the convoy cUlloose on the enem)-" torpedo 
planes as the [Japanese planes] roared to the attack. The planes could 
be clearly seen when the moonlight reflected hom their silver 'wings. 
The ship was zig-zagging in a desperate effort to avoid the torpedoes 
that were being dropped in our path. The noise ot battlc was 
terrific. .. this was our baptism of fire."" 
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A 1943 map of the Solomons sho\ving the Russells north of Guadalcanal. 
Rear Admiral Richmond Kellv Turner, head of the Allies' South 
Pacific Amphibious forces, proceeded with planning the invasion as 
the troops began to arrive on Guada1canalY He selected Major 
General john Hester, the commander of the Army's 43rd Division, as 
the commander of the Russells occupation force, consisting of units 
from the Army's 43rd Infantry Division, the 3rd Marine Raider 
Battalion, elements of the lath and 11 th Marine Defense Battalions, 
ACORN 3 (a naval engineering force designed to construct and 
operate a small air base), the 35th Naval Construction Battalion, and 
several others," 
The officers in charge of the operation, from Admiral Halsey on 
down, had to plan care folly because they had no accurate maps of the 
Russells and dId not know japan's intentions," Halsey coordinated 
air attacks with General George Kenney, commander of the Allied air 
forces in the South Pacific, against Jap?J1€se bases in the northern 
Solomons during the nights leading up to the assault to prevent 
unexpected japanese counterattacks," Rear Admiral Turner ordered 
8 The Journal of America's Military Past 
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c01nplete radio silence until it vvas clear that the Japanese kne"vv ot the 
American presence on the Russells."] Finally, the Navy \vorked out 
detailed loading and landing schedules," 
The planning came to fruition \vith the departure of the invasion 
force from Guadalcanal on the night of February 20. While this 
operation was only a very minor part of the overall \var in the Pacific, 
its significance should not be understated, The Chief of r";"vcl 
Operations' final report concerning the capture of the Russells 
claimed, "The Cleanslatc Operation is the first amphihiOLlS operation 
our forces have executed in which there have been employed only 
minor ye;sels and boats for the final movement to the 'obJective,"" 
George Dyer, the biographer of Rear Admiral Richmond Kelly Til mer, 
argues, liThe LeT [Landing Craft Tank] 'Vcterans/ of Cleanslate 
became the nuclei for the massive training cffort'! for fu t u re 
alnphibious operations.;;'; Cleanslate offered a full-scale rchcar5a] for 
future joinHorces operations, 
A collection of ships, ranging from destroyers to barges that could 
carry 700 tons, transported the invasion force. Each destroyer C?dTico 
approximately 300 troops and towed two Landing Craft 1'C1'S0I111:'l, 
one Landing Craft, Vehicle, and onc Landing Crail, 'Vlechamzed tt,e 
approximately fifty miles from Guadalcanal to the Russelis,~ In 
addition, twelve Landing Craft Tanks and various other sl1l.aJJef 
vessels carried additional men, equipment, and supplies.~'; Over 9/)00 
men "vere transported to the Russells during the fevy' days of the 
operation," .. 
Responsibility for the landings on February 21 tell to the 3rc 
NIarine Raider Battalion and the 43rd Arm.v Infantr'/ Division._ The 
h..'farines landed on the northern coast of IJavuvu ;nd secured the 
island," Soldiers from the 43rd Infantry Division landed at two 
separate locations on Banika and gained control.L~ \Vhile the landings 
were unopposed, they did not occur without some difficulties. The 
Marines found the ten'man rubber rafts that they used in the landing 
,>vere inadequate because of the frequent failure of outboard rnolors.-'\ 
In addition, if the Marines had faced opposition, they would h2','C 
done so without artillery support. Battery A of the 169tl1 Ficid 
Artillery Battalion had been assigned this task, but it took the 
battalion nineteen hours to land instead of the anticipated two after 
the crew of its transport became lost in the unfamiliar waters," \jlajor 
joseph Winecoff of the 11th Marine Defense BattaEon succinctly 
summarized his impre5sion of the landing: "IV!y only' observation OIl. 
the landing is as follows~it is excellent that we met no resistance,"! 
Once the islands had been occupied, the leaders or Oper,3.tion 
Cleans late immediatel\, svvitched their focus f!OITI occupation to the 
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This map show the Raiders' and the Army's schemes of maneuver \vhen they landed 
in the Islands in 1943. 
monumental task of transforming the islands into a usable base. The 
hvo main islands, Pavuvu and Banika, had large areas of rain forests, 
and the coconut plantations had not been worked since before the 
war. Of the two, Banika was definitely the better choice for the main 
base facilities. Overall, "The topography of Banika ... was highly 
favorable for the projected facilities. Well-drained shore areas, deep 
water, protected harbors, and lack of malaria made it a good 
location."" While there were sheltered harbors, excessive waler 
depths limited the amount of available anchorage. Because of the 
islands' volcanic origins, some areas close to shore had depths of up 
to 300 feet.~ While these obstacles were not impossible to overcome, 
they did hamper the development of the islands. 
The construction Lmits had three principal missions once ashore on 
the Russells. First, they had to build airfields as quickly as possible. 
Second, they had to build a PT boat base. Finally, they were required 
to establish staging areas for future operations. Several factors 
hampered their initial efforts. Shortages of materials were a major 
problem in the early days of occupation. Local supplies were used 
until they were exhausted. This led to other problems as men 
resorted to stealing to acquire needed resources. Furthermore, when 
10 The Journal of America' s Militarr~~~st __ ~ 
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supplies were available, inadequate storage facilities caused many of 
them to rot. One last difficultv was the lack of heavy constructwn 
equipment for use in building ;oads and airfields." '.. . 
The men had to deal with less than adequate provIsIons aI1G a 
hostile environment in addition to problems with supplies and 
equipment.)" Except for the occasional beef from some of the cows :'~ 
the island and a few fish, their entire diet was generally calmed tOOG. 
One regimental history explained, "One of the greatest difficulties 
encountered here was the matter of food. Dependent as tne troops 
were on shipping, [and] being quite isolated, there were periods 
when the rations were found deficient as to quantity and tlavor " .. 
Water at times was also difficult to corne by because the five-gallon 
cans used for storage and transport easily msted J ) Finally, the lilck of 
certain vitamins and the tropical clin1atc played havoc en t~e 
soldier's bodies. Roughly one-third of the men suffcJ:ed fro~: skin 
infections, and some suffered from malaria and other dIseases:" 
Despite these difficulties, engineers quickly began to transform 
parts of the islands by constructing roads, a PT boat base, huusmg. 
hospital facilities, and most important, airfields.' "The RussdJs soon 
became a bOOlntown-," Charles tv1e1son argues, "n Jerry-bUilt 
staging area for Allied units arriving in the South Pacific, reorgiJ-
nizing, or moving to other battlegrounds. tin Inadequate eqU1pmt''1~ 
and too few workers slowed the construction proccss, (-'spt1ciallv or 
the airfields. Furthern1ore, an initial lack ot adequatc survcyin~ and 
planning meant, "drainage, grading and surfacing of the air strips 
were not properly done."" These problems were later corrected. 
When the first runway was ultimately completed in May, it was 6,300 
feet long and could operate both bombers and fighters." This airfield, 
located sixty-live miles north of Henderson field on C;uadalcanal, 
greatly extended U.s. air power in the central. and northern 
Solomons.15 The engineers completed a second alrtJeld on Banika 
in June.1o 
Progress on the airfields became very important after the Japanese 
discovered the presence of the Americans on the islands. The US 
transformation of the islands continued unimpeded prior to March b. 
However, at 1:50 pm on that day the Japanese launched a surprise rm 
raid. Upward of twelve dive bombers and lwentl'-five fighters stmcl< 
the unfinished airfield and PT boat base with "absolutely no 
warning."" Although the damage was limited, the Americans 
suffered their first casualties on the islands due to enemy activitv with 
one killed in action and another twelve wounded.'" . 
The March 6 raid was only a precursor to lairly frequent Japanese 
air attacks over the next three n10nths. The Japanese generally 
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attacked at night with forces ranging from one to fifty planes and 
caused little damage." However, in raids on May 18 and 19, at least 
fifteen men were killed and another twentv were wounded." The air 
defense of the Russells gradually improv~d during this period with 
the implementation of better early warning systems, air cover from 
fighter planes on Guadalcanal, and by late May, the operation of the 
airfield on Banika itself. Japan launched its largest raids on the 
islands on June 7 and 12. In both raids, American fighters intercepted 
between forty and fifty Japanese planes. Total Japanese losses in the 
raids were close to fifty planes, while the United States lost thirteen. 
Fortunatelv for the United States, it safely recovered ten of the 
thirteen pilots, something the Japanese could not do." 
The initial stage of the transfonnation of the islands was complete 
with the start of regular operations from the airfield in late May. By 
this point, the United States was using the Russells as a PT boat base, 
airfield, training center, and staging area for future operations. 
Operation Cleanslate, by all measures, had been a success, and many 
valuable lessons had been learned. In terms of initial stages of the 
operation, military planners learned the importance of practicing 
loadings and landings, performing thorough reconnaissance, 
supplying sufficient numbers of logistical support troops in addition 
to combat forces, and developing and maintaining an adequate road 
system.52 Furthermore, the operation taught that beyond the initial 
?ccupation, "success of the venture depends upon the ability to 
deliver safely not only the first, but also the succeeding echelons of 
troops, engineers, ancillary units, equipment and operating and 
upkeep supplies and replacements."" In the end Cleanslate proved to 
be the successful" opening move of the drive on Rabaul."" 
The next step in the drive to Rabaul was the seizure of the !\Jew 
Georgia Islands, which are located about 120 miles northeast of the 
Russells. The Allies called this move, Operation Toenails, and in 
many ways it was based out of the Russells. As the main "Allied 
forward operating base and staging area" north of Guadalcanal, the 
Russells offered an intermediate step to New Georgia, the main island 
in the New Georgia Islands." From bases on Banika, American 
airplanes and PT boats could more easily reach New Georgia. Basing 
the attacking forces in the Russells also cut down the time and 
distance they had to travel over open waters that were susceptible to 
Japanese"ir attacks.~ 
US. forces used the Russells as a training center and staging area 
in preparation for Operation Toenails. The 43rd Infantry Division, in 
particular, underwent U an intense program of jungle and amphibious 
training."" Joseph Zimmer, the official historian of the 43rd Infantrv 
~ , 
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explained, "In the jungles of Banika imd p"vuvu, bunkers were 
constructed to simulate the ones the Japanese had built on 
Guadakanal. Time and time again, these bunkers were assaulted in 
mock combat."" In addition to being a training center, the Marine 4th 
Base Depot on Banika became the primary supply base for the 
operation. It had several primary responsibilities including the 
maintenance of at least 60 days of supplies and the supervision of the 
handling and loading of supplies imd equipment onto ships." The 
Marines of the 4th Base Depot handled supplies ranging from 
clothing to sand bags. At the start of Operation Toenails, the depot 
had almost 24,000 drums of fuel and lubricants and Ll,OOO tons of 
gear on hand for the invading force.'" 
As important as the Russells were for these other activities, they 
were more significant at this point in the war for their airfields. With 
the opening of the two fields in May and June, "for the first time it 
was possible to send fighter escort ,\lith bombing missions to the 
northern Solomons, thus permitting daylight bombing of targets 
which had hitherto been accessible only to night attack."" An 
example of this was on J1me 6 when American forces launched the 
first daylight attack against Bougainville in the Northem Solomons 
since the previous February. Twelve F4U Corsairs from the Russells 
escorted twelve torpedo bombers and eighteen dive-bombers on a 
successful mission."' From the perspective of pilots stationed on 
Guadalcanal, the airfields served an even more practical purpose as 
an emergency landing strip. On April 18, a force of sixteen P-:1Rs from 
Guadalcanal launched a daring and successful operation to shool 
down a plane carrying Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, the commander 
of the Imperial Japanese Fleet. The plan required the pilots to fly theIr 
P-38s to the limits of their range and beyond. After the interception 
and shoot-down of Yamamoto's aircraft, Captain Besby Holmes' P-38 
ran low on gas and had to Inake an €lnergency landing in the 
Russells. Without this airfield, Holmes faced the perilous danger of 
ditching at sea." 
While the first airfield on Banika was ready for emergency 
purposes in April, sustained operations did not begin until '\l"y 25 
when Marine Air Group 21 (MAG 21) began flying missions.'" At 
various hInes in the summer and fall, h.1arinc fighter squadrons 
(YMF) 124, 213, 214, and 221 served as part of '\IAC 2.l." The 
squadrons primarily escorted bomber missions, intercepted ]apzmest' 
air attacks, and provided air cover and support for other operations 
in the central and northern Solomons." 
Operation Toenails began in late June with American landings in 
the 1\ew Georgia Islands. Air support for the operatiun C<Hnp from 
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The nature of the terrain and the difficulties of construction in the Russells are evident 
in this photo of road construction. OfficilllllSll;1C photo. 
bases on the Russells and Guadalcanal."' The Allied air squadrons 
provided air cover for convoys, a constant daylight patrol over New 
Georgia, air strikes against enemy bases and shipping, reconnais-
sance, and close support for ground forces." According to one Marine 
historian, "in seizing the Central Solomons the united States acquired 
a series of unsinkable carriers. From two fields in the Russells, Allied 
planes not only covered Admiral [William] Halsey's northward 
advance but also intercepted Japanese air strikes against the 
Guadalcanal-Tulagi base."" 
Rear Admiral Marc A. 'vIilscher, Commander Air Solomons, had 
over 600 planes at his disposal at the beginning of Operation 
Toenails.7il Up to 120 of these planes were stationed on the Russells in 
July," . Every day from 7 am to 4:30 pm thirty-two fighters were 
constantly on patrol over New Georgia. Altogether sixteen separate 
flights participated each day with four originating from the Russells 
and twelve from Guada1canal." Although Guadalcanal provided the 
bulk of the flights, Major General 'vIillard Harmon, the commanding 
The Journal of America' 5 Military Past 
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General of US. Army forces in the South Pacific Area, "doubted that 
it could have been' achieved without the aid of the two Russell 
strips."" Admiral Halsey later wrote, "The landing proceeded 
smoothly, under an umbrella of thirty-two fighters from Cuadakanal 
and the Russells, which beat off attempted attacks twice during the 
n10rning."74 Furthermore, Japanese air attacks against the invading 
force achieved only three hits on American shipping in the entire 
month of July." ultimately because of their own heavy losses in these 
raids-close to 100 planes-the Japanese abandoned efforts to launch 
air raids or to send reinforcements in daylight." 
While heavy fighting still continued in the New Georgia Islands at 
the beginning of August, it was beginning to wind down. The 
squadrons stationed on the Russells during August and Septe'micer 
generally performed escort duty, some reconnaissance, and 
occasional strafing attacks. 77 By mid-August air strength on the 
islands fluctuated as the fighter squadrons began to move to the new 
airstrips on ).1unda in the New Georgia islands."" Bv early October 
American bombers, for the most part, had replaced the fighters. 
The best example of the fluctuation in fighter strength on the 
islands is VMF 214 or as it is better known because of a 1970s 
television series, the Black Sheep Squadron. VMF 214 had been 
reconstituted in early September under the command of i\itajor 
Gregory "Pappy" Boyington and was stationed briefly in the 
Russells." The squadron flew one significant mission from the 
Russells on September 16. Twenty Corsairs from VMF 214 escorted 
150 dive-bombers and torpedo planes on an attack ncar 
Bougainville." VlvlF 214 definitely shot down eleven Japanese planes 
and probably another eight. The next day the squadron flew to 
lvlunda and stayed there until the end of September. It returned to the 
Russells for the first ten days of October before leaving the Russells 
for good on October 10.8; The only significant action in its second 
stay in the Russells was on October 4 when the squadron shot 
down six more Japanese planes, and according to one intelligence 
memorandum/ Major Boyington gave a "demonstration of racial 
superiority.""' 
Sharing the Russell airfields with VlvlF 214 was a squadron of new' 
night fighters making its first appearance in the Pacific. en!il late 
1943, there was little the Americans could do to impede japanese 
nighttime attacks besides using ground-based anti-aircraft weapons. 
Since American fighters were not equipped with radar they could not 
intercept targets at night. This changed in September '1943 with the 
arrival of VlvlF (N) 531 in the Russells.~) This squadron flew radar-
equipped Lockheed PV-l Venturas. Although the PV-ls proved 
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generally ineffective, the installation of radar' on fighter planes 
marked a major shift in their ability to intercept the enemy at night.84 
The mission of the Russell airfields began to change in late 
September and early October. By this time the Russells were no 
longer threatened by Japanese air attacks; therefore, most American 
fighters had been shifted to more forward bases." In their place, 
bombers became the most significant occupants. In particular, Army 
Air Force B-25s from the 42nd Bombardment Group used the base for 
attacks on Rabaul and Bougainville."' The raids on Bougainville were 
particularly significant as all the B-25s used in that campaign were 
based in the Russells." Over the last ·two weeks in Oelober, the 42nd 
Bombardment Group launched raids on at least eight separate days 
with great success.'" Following the actual American invasion of 
Bougainville in early November, the group continued to provide 
bombing support until the island was secured. The completion of the 
Bougainville campaign and final isolation of Rabaul in early 1944 in 
many ways completed the mission of the Russells as a base of air 
combat operations. While the last combat planes did not leave until 
late 1944, they flew few actual combat missions after February."' 
The metamorphosis of the Russells continued after the end of the 
combat operations in 1944. From then until early 1945, the Russells 
served five major functions. They proVided naval base facilities for 
one. PT boat squadron, destroyers in transit, and cargo ships. The 
aIrfIelds remamed open and were used primarily for transportation 
purposes. Seabees built additional hospitals to expand the Russells' 
capabilities in this area. The islands also continued to be used as a 
supply base. Finally, the 1st Marine Division used Pavuvu as a 
staging area for its operations against Peleliu and Okinawa." 
The Russells remained a hive of activity even with the change in 
mISSIOn. Seventeen different Seabee battalions spent at least a month 
on the islands working on various construction projects." The harbor 
faClhtJes on average handled thirty-seven cargo ships a day, and 
ImmedIately prior to the Peleliu operation in the late summer 1944, 
they serviced eighty." The number of personnel on the island 
fluctuated depending on the presence of training divisions on the 
Islands. Between January 1944 and February 1945, no fewer than 
16,000 ~ervIce personnel were on the islands. The number peaked at 
approxImately 6?,000 m Augustl944 immediately prior to the 1st 
Marme DIVISIon s departure lor l'eleliu. After Februarv 1945 when 
the Ist'Marine Division left for the last time, the number'of personnel 
on theislands steadily declined to less than 5,000 by August." 
VVlule the Russells gradually lost military importance as American 
forces advanced beyond the Solomons, their history would be 
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incomplete without an examination of the experiences of the Ist 
Marine Division on the islands. This division was one of the most 
famous in World \IVar 11 and served in several ll1ajor Paciflc 
campaigns. While most of the Marines would have traded the 
horrors of combat for more time on the Russells, many remem beree! 
the Russells as the most inhospitable place they served outside of 
combat zones." 
May 1944 to February 1945 proved the busiest time of the war in 
terms of actual personnel on the Russells. The 1st Marine DivislOl1 
moved from Cape Gloucester on New Britain to Pavuvu in the 
Russells in May. Pavuvu had played only a very minor role in the lise 
of the Russells' as a base prior to the division's arrival. While it was 
the largest island in the Russells, its terrain and environment wpre 
much less suited for use than Banika. Only a small part of Pavuvu 
had been cleared prior to the war for coconut plantations, and most 
of the island remained covered in dense jung-le." It was in this 
environment that the 1st Marines Inade their home on l\,:\"o separate 
occasions in 1944 and early 1945. 
The 1st Marine Division moved to Pavuvu for rest, rehabilitation, 
and training after experiencing horrible conditions and cOlnba.! in fhe 
Cape Gloucester campaign on New Britain." Marine 1\1ajor C,cnl'ral 
Roy S. Geiger, commander of the 1lI Amphibious Corps, chose 
Pavuvu as the base for the 1st Division after reconnoitering the 
southern Solomons in an airplane.97 He \vanted to avoid stationing 
the division on Guadalcanal because other divisions on that isicmd 
had been forced to supply work details of up to 1,000 men a day. . He 
also believed stationing the division near the 4th Base Depot on 
Banika vvould provide easy access to supplies,~~ Ceiger was \,,/1'on.; 
on both accounts, but he was not the only one to develop incorrect 
impressions after viewing the Russells from a distance. Private LB. 
Sledge remembers approaching the Russells on a transport sh ip and 
thinking-, "The symmetrical groves [of the coconut palms] and clear 
water were beau·blu!." He added, "Pavuvu looked picturesCjUl'."·" 
Sledge soon found the view from the air and sea proved quite 
different from the one on the ground. "Once ashore," he explains, 
"one found the extensive coconut groves choked wi th rotting 
coconuts. The apparently solid ground was soft and turned qu ickly 
to mud when subjected to foot or vehicular traffic"'" Pavuvu simply 
was not ready for the 1st Marine Division. The 'Loth Seabees had the 
initial job of -transfonning part of Pavuvu into a CClll1P and training 
center. However, they were not highly motivated to complete their 
work since they were supposed to be on R & R themselves. To make 
matters ,"v~rse, the 1st Division arrived a month earlie,- thzm 
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scheduled.'''' The result was not pretty. Marine General Oliver Smith 
explained the problem--"The camp was very compact, and, with 
good roads, camp administration would have been simple. When we 
arrived, however, the camp was hardly more than a bivouac./l101 
The 1st Marine Division established its camp on a 600-acre coconut 
plantation on the northern coast of Pavuvu. Since this plantation was 
less than one square mile, the roughly 27,000 Marines of the 1st 
Division lived and trained in a tight environment.103 Marines leaving 
Cape Gloucester had high hopes of a long rest in Australia or New 
Zealand. Robert Leckie remembered: "All the way [from New 
Britain] we had indulged in silly speculation on the impossibility of 
sending our diseased, decimated division into action again without a 
rest in Australia, or New Zealand, if not back in the States.""" 
Accordingly, the Marines were shocked on their arrival on Pavuvu. "I 
have never discovered a satisfactory reason for sending us to the rat-
infested swamp that was Pavuvu," writes Private james johnson."; 
The aforementioned Private Sledge explains, "None of us, old hands 
or replacements, could fathom why the division command chose 
Pavuvu."wo As the Marines arrived, they had to build roads, construct 
camp facilities, and clear coconuts.'" Even then, the conditions were 
only "passably endurable."'" 
The Marines had to perform duties normally accomplished by the 
Seabees or construction units because they "found themselves 
dumped on a rain-soaked, rat-infested hunk of real estate where 
virtually nothing had been done to prepare for their arrival." The 
Division was hampered in these efforts because its assigned 
construction units, including the 19th Seabees, lacked equipment,'"' 
Seventy-fIVe percent of their equipment was inoperable because of 
wear and tear and a shortage of spare parts, Furthermore, the 3rd 
Marine Division had stripped the 4th Base Depot of trucks and 
equipment for its deployment to Guam. "0 The result was that much 
work had to be done bv hand where "there was no underbrush to be 
cleared, but there was {,biquitous mud to be conquered.'''" 
The Marines ran into other difficulties in addition to having to 
build their own camp, no They were in such poor shape when the men 
arnved on Pavuvu that their rations were supposed to be increased 
by twenty-five percent, This did not happen. At one point, the 
Marmes even started butchering some of the 600 cows that had been 
abandoned along with the plantations at the beginning of the war. 
However, Australia, which controlled the islands before the war, 
ordered this stopped. 113 The result of these problems was a decided 
lack of fresh food. The men had fresh meat onlv once a week on 
average, and fresh eggs only twice in four months. The normal fare 
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was Spam, dehydrated potatoes, and powdered eggs. "" 
The Marines had to deal with a variety of animals and insects in 
addition to the poor rations. Among the most common were black 
gnats, rats, iguanas, pigeons, bullfrogs, and crocodiles. u The worst, 
however, were the crabs. Sledge explains, "The most loathsome 
vermin on Pavuvu were the land crabs. Their blue-black bodies were 
about the size of the palm of a man's hand, and bristles and spines 
covered their legs. ... Periodically we reached the point of rage over 
these filthy things and chased them out from under boxes, ,eabag', 
and cots."'" On the 1st Division's second stav on Pavuvu in 
December, Sledge claims that he and his tent mates killed over 100 
crabs in their tent alone.'" 
Other issues compounded the problems. Shortages of fresh water 
left little for bathing. The Marines often waited for the frequent 
afternoon storms in order to bathe in the rain. The key \V2S to get 
lathered and rinsed off before these brief showers ended, ", 
Furthermore, ·with one exception, there v·,rere fe\v opportunities for 
entertainment. While films were generally shown nightly, they were 
not of very high quality. Of greater importance to the men, they 
seldom had access to more than three beers per week,"" 
The one example of quality entertainment occurred by chance 311Q 
only because of one entertainer's commitment to serve the troops. 
The Marines enviuushl looked across the channel to Banika. To lheln, 
"Banika was a fleshpot, Banika \vas the big tovvn, Banikd I.,vas 
Broadway. ... And Banika had beer."liC' There \vas also "forbidden 
fruit: the nurses."'" There was some truth to these claims. Madne 
pilots stationed at Banika's airfields lived in what they (al,led 
"palatial" accommodations that provided "the mosl idyllic living in 
the eastern Solomons." Among their perks were electrified huts and 
a refrigerator with cold beer.'" Seldom, though, did the Marines 
across the channel enjoy these comforts, However, on one occasion 
the paradise of Banika made a special and unscheduled visit to 
Pavuvu. 
usa shows periodically stopped at Banika, but normally never 
made it to Pavuvu. This changed in 1944 when Bob llope, Patti 
Thomas, Frances Langford, and jerry Colonna added a performance 
on Pavuvu. They Hew with their entourage on eight Piper cub planes 
to Pavuvu where they had to land on a road.'" 'Ihe Marines wpre 
overjoyed. Private Sl~dge remelnbers it as "the finest enterlairuncnt t 
ever sa\v overscas. iI . 2-l Private Johnson claims, "For us masses of the 
marine line companies, it was truly inspiring to have pC'Jplc as 
famous as Bob Hope and his crew-Jerry Colonna, Patly Thomas, and 
all-come and do a show for us."'" What johnson, Sledge, and the 
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~larine F4 Corsairs taxi at their base in the Russells. 
other Marines did not know was the affection went both ways. After 
the war, Hope claimed, "it was the most exciting thing that happened 
on the trip [to the South Pacific in 1944] to see those 15,000 guYS all 
looking up and cheering each little plane as she came in."m -
Unfortunately, Hope's visit was the exception, and most of the 
Marines had to simply plod through their drearv existence on 
Pavuvu. The conditions on the island overwhelmed some. One 
historian notes that no other place in the Pacific surpassed Pavuvu "in 
isolation, geographic ferocity, and sheer boredom."m Private Sledge 
best summarizes the feeling of most Marines, "On Pavuvu we felt as 
though we were a million miles from not onlv home but from 
anything else that bespoke of civilization."'" niis situation had a 
dramatic affect on both the phvsical health and morale of the Marines. 
"The incidence of sickness sh~t upward, while morale plummeted to 
the lowest point it ever reached during the Pacific service of this elite 
outfit [the 1st Marine Division]," recalls Marine historian Frank 
Hough."'· Several men even resorted to suicide.'" 
The. Marines still had to prepare for the next campaign while 
endurmg these hardships. The 1st Division used Pavuvu as its 
training center for both the Peleliu and Okinawa campaigns.Il' The 
work of camp construction, limited space, and equipment shortages 
severely hampered training.'" Private Sledge recalls, "Pavuvu was so 
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small that most of our field exercises were of company sizc rather 
than battalion or regimental."1J3 Brigadier General W. A. WC1chtJer 
remembered, "The island was a veritable jungle in which 3 troop 
unit even as small as a platoon would have great difficulty 
maneuvering.1I13.j lvlarines on maneuvers found themselves f'dodging 
among heads and mess halls and tripping over the guy ropes of their 
own tents." Space was so limited that conditioning hikes consisted of 
marching in circles.135 One particular glaring deficiency was the Jack 
of amphibian tractors for training.''' Some of this equipment arrived 
barely in time for loading."? Finally, when it was time for the lst 
Division to disembark from the Russells, the loading facilities were 
inadequate and "loading was a piecemeal process."'J>l 
The departure of the 1st Marine Division for the Okinawa invasion 
marked the end of the Russells as a significant base. From Feliruary 
1945 onward the principal mission of the forces in the Russells was to 
close the base down. Only one airfield was kept open for emergency 
purposes, and other facilities were gradually reduced in size or 
closed.'" Eventually, any materials or supplies that could not be 
removed were destroved.14~ 
The shutting down' of the Russells in 1945 occurred without notice, 
and the islands returned to the obscurity of their pre-war existence. 
Historians have often overlooked the logistical support bases that 
made those operations possible in their desire to cover the campaigns 
and battles of the war. Although the Russells are only one smail 
group of islands that played this role, and operations from this basl' 
did not change the outcome of the war, they were important 
nevertheless. American campaigns in the central and northern 
Solomons would have been much more difficult without Pavu Hl 
and Banika. 
Having said this, the Russells' effectiveness as a base was mixed. 
The airfields on Banika provided brief, but invaluable, support for 
operations against New Georgia, Bougainville, and Rabaul. While 
most of these air operations could have been based Ollt of 
Guadalcanal without the help of the Russells, planes flying from 
Henderson Field faced an additional 100 miles on any round trip 
flight to the central and northern Solomons. This added dist,mce 
would have created a myriad of problems. Furthermore, the naval 
base facilities on the Russells shortened the distance transport ships 
had to travel through potentially dangerous v..raters to reach targets 
further north. 
While the Russells were used successfully as an air and naval base, 
their effectiveness as a staging area and training center is ques-
tionable. While General Geiger's decision to place the 1st Division on 
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The lvfarines made some order out of the tropical morass. The engineers that are 
depicted are laying concrete for a messhall. Tents for !vlarines are clearly visible to the 
rear of the photo. Official LrS}vfC phofo. 
Pavuvu in Mav 1944 was a terrible mistake, it is understandable 
considering his limited knowledge of the islands at that time. 
However, the decision to return the division to the Russells a second 
time raises questions about the Marine leaders' judgment. Were they 
concerned about the welfare of their men, or the quality of their 
training? 
""'hUe the effectiveness of the military's use of the islands can be 
debated, their importance to the war effort cannot. Operation 
Cleanslate provided invaluable experience in amphibious operations, 
Air squadrons from the islands' airfields flew air cover, close air 
support, and bombing missions for operations against New Georgia, 
Bougainvllle, and Rabaul. Even after combat operations were 
completed in early 1944, the Russells remained important as supply 
and training areas. The United States transformed the Russells in 
World War II and made them an important part of the war effort. The 
United States would have faced many more difficulties in the 
Solomons campaign without them. 
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Despite the festivities surrounding the bicentennial of the 
Louisiana Purchase (April 30, 1803), it is easy to overlook lhe 
momentous military and civilian issues of the tin1e. European 
administrations in c~~lonial America in 1803 \verc diverse, 3ith(~ugh 
each had to deal with similar problems-defense, land settlern2nt, lax 
and tariff collection, recalcitrant colonials, and relations vvith the 
Indians. There were son1C similarities between French and Spanish 
institutions during the late eighteenth-century in particular, and 
hence colonial Louisiana-stretching geographically [rom the 
Mississippi River Delta to the Rocky Mountains-offers a unique 
case study. 
Administration in colonial Louisiana, first by France and, by trcatv 
after 1769 by Spain, which then retroceded it to France on :\ ovembcr 
30, 1803-in time lor its final transfer to the United States twenty davs 
later-understandablv exhibited all of the familiar tra'its ·of 
overlapping administ;ative prerogatives, mutually exclusive offices, 
and rival claims to authoritv. In other words, Louisiana's colonial 
administration mirrored the problems of governments in Europe. The 
SystClTI of royal patronage, whereby a term of office in the colonies 
\'\.'as universally regarded by administrators or military governors as 
an opportunity to acquire property and riches in order to return home 
as a gentleman of means, added yet another dilnension to the already 
existing problems. The dualistic system of colonial administralion, 
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